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sarily limited God, or rather, had no real knowledge of Him. Said Sextus, the Pythagorean: "Do not investigate the name of God, because you will not find it. For everything which is called by a name, receives its appellation from that which is more worthy than itself, so that it is one person that calls, and another that hears. Who is it, therefore, that has given a name to God? *God*, however, is not a name for God, but an indication of what we conceive of him." From such passages we can see why the Alchemists called this "Ineffable One," *Mercury, Luna, Sol, Argent vive, Phœbus, Sulphur, Antimony, Elizir, Alcahest, Salt*, and other whimsical names, letting the predicates applied determine the nature of what was meant. If a writer, speaking of "Alcahest," should say that it is a somewhat that rises in the east, and sets in the west, gives light to the earth, and causes the growth of plants by its heat, &c., we should not misunderstand his meaning—it would be giving us the nature of the thing without the common

name. Every one attaches some sort of significance to the words "Life," "God," "Reason," "Instinct," &c., and yet who comprehends them? It is evident that in most cases the word stands for the thing, and hence when one speaks of such things by name, the hearer yawns and looks listless, as if he thought: "Well, I know all about that—I learned that when a child, in the Catechism." The Alchemists (and Du Fresnoy names nearly a thousand of these prolific writers) determined that no one should flatter himself that he knew the nature or the subject before he saw the predicates applied. Hence the strange names about which such spiritual doctrines were inculcated. "If we have concealed anything," says Geber, "ye sons of learning, wonder not, for we have not concealed it from you, but have delivered it in such language as that it may be hid from evil men, and that the unjust and vile might not know it. But, ye sons of Truth, search, and you shall find this most excellent gift of God, which he has reserved for you."

EDITORIALS.

ORIGINALITY.

It is natural that in America more than elsewhere, there should be a popular demand for originality. In Europe, each nation has, in the course of centuries, accumulated a stock of its own peculiar creations. America is sneered at for the lack of these. We have not had time as yet to develop spiritual capital on a scale to correspond to our material pretensions. Hence, we, as a people, feel very sensitive on this point, and whenever any new literary enterprise is started, it is met on every hand by inquiries like these: "Is it original, or only an importation of European ideas?" "Why not publish something indigenous?" It grows cynical at the sight of erudition, and vents its spleen with indignation: "Why rifle the graves of centuries? You are no hyena! Does not the spring bring forth its flowers, and every summer its swarms of gnats? Why build a bridge of rotten coffin planks, or wear a wedding garment of mummy wrap-

page? Why desecrate the Present, by offering it time-stained paper from the shelves of the Past?"

In so far as these inquiries are addressed to our own undertaking, we have a word to offer in self-justification. We have no objection to originality of the right stamp. An originality which cherishes its own little idiosyncrasies we despise. If we must differ from other people, let us differ in having a wide cosmopolitan culture. "All men are alike in possessing defects," says Goethe; "in excellencies alone, it is, that great differences may be found."

What philosophic originality may be, we hope to show by the following consideration:

It is the province of Philosophy to dissolve and make clear to itself the entire phenomena of the world. These phenomena consist of two kinds: *first*, the products of nature, or immediate existence; *second*, the products of spirit, including what modifications man has wrought upon

the former, and his independent creations. These spiritual products may be again subdivided into *practical* (in which the *will* predominates)—the institutions of civilization—and *theoretical* (in which the *intellect* predominates)—art, religion, science, &c. Not only must Philosophy explain the immediate phenomena of nature—it must also explain the mediate phenomena of spirit. And not only are the institutions of civilization proper objects of study, but still more is this theoretic side that which demands the highest activity of the philosopher.

To examine the thoughts of man—to unravel them and make them clear—must constitute the earliest employment of the speculative thinker; his first business is to comprehend the thought of the world; to dissolve for himself the solutions which have dissolved the world before him. Hence, the prevalent opinion that it is far higher to be an "original investigator" than to be engaged in studying the thoughts of others, leaves out of view the fact that the thoughts of other men are just as much objective phenomena to the individual philosopher as the ground he walks on. They need explanation just as much. If I can explain the thoughts of the profoundest men of the world, and make clear wherein they differed among themselves and from the truth, certainly I am more original than they were. For is not "original" to be used in the sense of *primariness*, of approximation to the absolute, universal truth? He who varies from the truth must be secondary, and owe his defections to somewhat alien to his being, and therefore be himself subordinate thereto. Only the Truth makes Free and Original. How many people stand in the way of their own originality! If an absolute Science should be discovered by anybody, we could all become absolutely original by mastering it. So much as I have mastered of science, I have dissolved into me, and have not left it standing alien and opposed to me, but it is now my own.

Our course, then, in the practical endeavor to elevate the tone of American thinking, is plain: we must furnish convenient access to the deepest thinkers of ancient and modern times. To prepare translations and commentary, together with original exposition, is our object. Originality will take care of itself. Once disciplined in Speculative thought, the new growths of our national life will furnish us objects whose comprehension shall constitute original philosophy without parallel. Meanwhile it must be confessed that those who set up this cry for originality are not best employed. Their ideals are commonplace, and their demand is too easily satisfied with the mere whimsical, and they

do not readily enough distinguish therefrom the excellent.

CONTENTS OF THE JOURNAL.

Thus far the articles of this journal have given most prominence to art in its various forms. The speculative content of art is more readily seen than that of any other form, for the reason that its sensuous element allows a more genial exposition. The critique of the Second Part of Faust, by Rosenerantz, published in this number, is an eminent example of the effect which the study of Speculative Philosophy has upon the analytical understanding. Is not the professor of logic able to follow the poet, and interpret the products of his creative imagination? The portion of Hegel's *Æsthetics*, published in this number, giving, as it does, the historical groundwork of art, furnishes in a genial form an outline of the Philosophy of History. Doubtless the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon mind make it difficult to see in art what it has for such nations as the Italians and Germans; we have the reflective intellect, and do not readily attain the standpoint of the creative imagination.

STYLE.

In order to secure against ambiguity, it is sometimes necessary to make inelegant repetitions, and, to give to a limiting clause its proper degree of subordination, such devices as parentheses, dashes, etc., have to be used to such a degree as to disfigure the page. Capitals and italics are also used without stint to mark important words. The adjective has frequently to be used substantively, and, if rare, this use is marked by commencing it with a capital.

There are three styles, which correspond to the three grades of intellectual culture. The sensuous stage uses simple, categorical sentences, and relates facts, while the reflective stage uses hypothetical ones, and marks relations between one fact and another; it introduces antithesis. The stage of the Reason uses the disjunctive sentence, and makes an assertion exhaustive, by comprehending in it a multitude of interdependencies and exclusions. Thus it happens that the style of a Hegel is very difficult to master, and cannot be translated adequately into the sensuous style, although many have tried it. A person is very apt to blame the style of a deep thinker when he encounters him for the first time. It requires an "expert swimmer" to follow the discourse, but for no other reason than that the mind has not acquired the strength requisite to grasp in one thought a wide extent of conceptions.